Integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1825-1925 by Campbell, Gareth & Rogers, Meeghan
Integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges,
1825-1925
Campbell, G., & Rogers, M. (2017). Integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1825-
1925. Economic History Review, 70(4), 1185-1218. https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12423
Published in:
Economic History Review
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2017 Economic History Society .
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
  
 
 
 
 
 
Integration between the  
London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1825-1925
1
 
 
 
 
Gareth Campbell and Meeghan Rogers 
Queen’s University Management School 
Queen's University Belfast 
Belfast 
BT7 1NN 
gareth.campbell@qub.ac.uk 
mrogers15@qub.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
The integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges is analyzed during the 
era when they were still developing as asset markets. The domestic securities on both 
exchanges showed little sustained integration, even when controlling for the different 
characteristics of stocks, implying that the pricing of securities in the US and UK were still 
being driven by local factors. However, there was considerable integration between New 
York and those listings on London which operated internationally. These results place a limit 
on the view that pre-World War I was the first era of globalization in terms of capital 
markets, and suggest that the listing of foreign securities may be one of the primary 
mechanisms driving asset market integration. 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of recent research has argued that the period before World War I was the first 
era of globalisation, and that there were highly integrated financial markets during this time. 
O’Rourke and Williamson2 argue that ‘international capital markets were extremely well 
integrated in the late nineteenth century’. Obstfeld and Taylor3 suggest that there have been 
‘two great phases of integration, one before 1914, and one in the contemporary period.’ 
Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin
4
 argue that by some measures the level of financial integration 
before 1914 remains unsurpassed, but in other respects was not as deep as it is in the modern 
era. Volosovych
5
 and Mauro
6
 suggest that bond market integration was high before World 
War I, but not as high as the modern era. Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst
7
 have shown that 
global equity market correlations immediately prior to World War I were relatively high, 
being surpassed only briefly during the Great Depression and the late 1990s. Obstfeld and 
Taylor
8
 also find a peak in equity market correlations before 1914. Sylla, Wilson and Wright
9
 
also argue that ‘the integration of trans-Atlantic capital markets began after 1815, far earlier 
than previously thought by those who consider the period 1870–1914 to be the first era of 
financial globalization’. 
 In this paper, we focus on the integration between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), allowing us to examine not just the level of 
integration, but more importantly the mechanisms by which it occurred. We are unaware of 
any other paper which has delineated how and why capital markets integrated in this ‘first era 
of globalisation’.  
                                                 
2
 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘Globalisation and history’ p.225 
3
 Obstfeld and Taylor, ‘Global Capital Markets’ p.121 
4
 Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, ‘Was there really’ 
5
 Volosovych, ‘Market integration’ 
6
 Mauro, ‘Emerging market spreads’ 
7
 Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst, ‘Long-term,’ p. 21 
8
 Obstfeld and Taylor, ‘Historical Perspective’ p.159 
9
 Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’, p.636 
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For much of the period under consideration, London and New York were the two 
largest stock markets in the world. By the end of our sample period, in the mid-1920s, New 
York was becoming regarded as the leading financial centre in the world
10
. London was still 
larger in terms of total equity market capitalisation, but New York was a close second, and 
they were both much greater than any other market worldwide, as shown by Moore
11
, and 
summarised in Table 1. 
<< INSERT TABLE 1>> 
Moore
12
 has also shown that by 1903 London was clearly the largest equity market in 
the world, and New York had become firmly established in second place. As shown in Table 
1, the total market capitalization of equities on New York was about the same as the next five 
largest stock exchanges from around the world put together. NYSE had fewer stocks listed 
than some other exchanges, but Michie notes that ‘this reflected a deliberate policy of 
exclusion, rather than any lack of applications for listings.13’ New York was particularly 
discerning in terms of which companies it accepted for listing, focusing on very large firms, 
which were likely to be heavily traded, as can be seen from the average capitalization figures 
in Table 1. The lower number of securities actually reflected its premium position, and 
sophistication. 
Qualitative evidence suggests New York was regarded as the leading foreign market 
by British newspapers in earlier decades as well. By 1885 the ‘Foreign Commercial 
Intelligence’ section of The Times was dominated by New York, with detailed stock price 
tables which took up more space than all of the other international exchanges put together. 
From its very first edition in 1888, the Financial Times (then the London Financial Guide), 
                                                 
10
 Sobel, ‘Big board’, p. 220 
11
 Moore ‘World Financial Markets’, Table 4. 
12
 Moore ‘World Financial Markets’, Table 4. 
13
 Michie, ‘London and New York’, p.185 
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published detailed stock price tables for the ‘American Markets’. No such detail or 
prominence was given to any other stock market apart from London.  
For the first half of the sample period, between 1825 and 1875, New York could 
probably be regarded as being less developed than London, or indeed some other exchanges. 
However, the inclusion of this earlier period provides us with a benchmark against which we 
can compare the later period. It allows us to determine if there were substantial differences in 
integration depending on the level of sophistication of the markets, and whether there was a 
gradual process of integration. 
The period between 1825 and 1925 covered in this paper is also a particularly 
interesting time to study as there were a number of conditions prevailing which should have 
promoted integration. In terms of the domestic securities on each exchange, there were close 
economic links between the economies of the UK and USA. An analysis of patterns in 
national income between 1830 and 1925 shows that there was a highly significant 
relationship (t-statistic = 2.95) between UK and USA GDP growth
14
. In addition, the USA 
was the most important trading partner of the UK throughout almost the entire period. From 
1854, when the first data was reported, to at least 1925, the UK imported more from the USA 
than from any other country
15
. Even if the imports in the earlier period were raw materials, 
such as cotton, they would often have been transported by railroads, and the production 
partially financed by banks, both of which were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
There were also stable exchange rates, with the classic gold standard in operation between 
1879 and 1913. These links could have led to common exposure to risks and shocks for 
securities traded in London and New York.   
                                                 
14
 Calculated from data obtained from MeasuringWorth.com. UK GDP data begins in 1830. 
15
 Mitchell, ‘International Historical Statistics: Europe’, p.663 
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However, our analysis is not limited to these domestic securities. The key message of 
the paper is that there were numerous possible mechanisms by which integration could have 
occurred. Integration could have been promoted via foreign investment.  During this period 
there were high levels of capital mobility, with very few restrictions placed on trading assets 
across borders. Quinn
16
 finds that before 1913 financial openness was greater than at any 
other subsequent period. This led to a large proportion of US securities being owned by 
European, particularly British, investors. Sylla, Wilson and Wright
17
 note that even in 
1803/04 nearly half of the US securities outstanding were held by foreigners. In 1873 about 
78.6 per cent of the shares in the Illinois Central Railroad were held abroad
18
. In the mid-
1890s, 52 per cent of the Pennsylvania Railroad was owned by overseas investors.
19
 With 
British investors holding considerable amounts of American assets, the buying and selling of 
UK and US shares could have been affected by the same factors. As time progressed, it 
became increasingly common for US firms to list on the London Stock Exchange. If 
securities were moving primarily on regional issues, then these foreign listings could have 
been a mechanism which made the different markets move in similar ways.  
Furthermore, there were some assets which were listed simultaneously in both 
markets. The consistency of pricing of these cross-listed assets could have been affected by 
the major advances in communication technology during the period, particularly with the 
laying of the transatlantic telegraph cable in 1866. It took about four weeks for information to 
travel across the Atlantic in the 1820s and 1830s
20
, but this had fallen to about 30 seconds by 
1911
21
. Hoag finds that the laying of the telegraph had an immediate impact on the pricing of 
US securities in both markets, and London quickly incorporated new information from New 
                                                 
16
 Quinn, ‘Capital account liberalisation’ 
17
 Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’, p.617 
18
 Wilkins, ‘Foreign Investment’, p.119 
19
 Churella, ‘Pennsylvania Railroad’ p.714 
20
 Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’, p.633 
21
 Michie ‘Global Securities Market’ p.130 
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York
22
. This should have ensured there was little information asymmetry between London 
and New York, and may have promoted integration. 
To analyse the extent of integration, and the mechanisms by which it occurred, we 
have compiled extensive datasets of securities traded on the London and New York Stock 
Exchanges. We have obtained data on several thousand common stocks, preference shares, 
and corporate bonds, on a monthly basis over the hundred year period between 1825 and 
1925. This allows us to analyse the movements and connections on both markets, in more 
detail than has ever been attempted before. 
Sylla, Wilson and Wright
23
 note that there are several ways to measure integration. 
The narrowest is to look at identical assets which are traded in different markets, as has been 
done for several assets and time periods for London and New York
24
. This has the advantage 
of enabling a precise analysis of whether there were differences in how an asset was priced in 
each market, but the conclusions are limited to just the small subset of securities which were 
cross-listed. A broader approach, and the method favoured by financial economists in recent 
years
25
, is to look at assets which may have similar characteristics, but which are not the 
same. This reveals whether the securities in different markets are responding to the same 
shocks and risk factors as each other. In this vein, Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst
26
 have 
analysed long-run correlations between portfolios of equities in different countries, and 
Edelstein
27
 has conducted a principal-components analysis to determine if there were 
common factors driving the returns of companies which operated in different countries and 
                                                 
22
 Hoag, ‘Atlantic telegraph’ 
23
 Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’ 
24
 Neal, ‘International Capital Markets,’ ‘Disintegration,’ Michie, ‘London and New York,’ Hoag, ‘Atlantic 
telegraph’, Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’ and Garbade and Silber, ‘Technology’. 
25
 Pukthuanthong and Roll, ‘Global market integration,’ Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, ‘International stock return 
comovements,’ Bekaert and Harvey, ‘Time-varying integration,’ Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, ‘Market integration,’ 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine, ‘Dating the integration,’ Eiling and Gerard, ‘Emerging Equity,’ Lehkonen, 
‘Stock market integration’. 
26
 Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst, ‘Long-term,’ p. 21 
27
 Edelstein, ‘Overseas investment’, p.150-157 
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industries. Le Bris
28
 has examined whether US and French securities experienced similar risk 
and return trade-offs. 
Pukthuanthong and Roll, ‘Global market integration,’ have argued that if there are 
actually multiple risk factors, the explanatory power (R
2
) from a regression including these 
factors should provide a better measure of integration than simple correlations. They argue 
that this measure makes sense intuitively as ‘if there is no unexplained variation at all (i.e., if 
the multi-factor R-square is truly 1.0), global influences account for everything. It is hard to 
imagine that this means anything other than perfect integration. Conversely, if local or 
regional influences explain all of a country’s returns, the country is completely segmented 
financially for all practical purposes.
29’ 
We embrace this focus on R
2
 and apply it within the context of the London and New 
York Stock Exchanges, by regressing the returns of a market index of securities listed on 
NYSE against various LSE risk factors. Intuitively, we are asking how well the returns of the 
New York market can be explained by the returns of different segments of the London 
market. If the R
2
 is high it means New York and London are moving closely together, and are 
strongly integrated. If the R
2
 is low it means New York is moving differently from London, 
and they are not integrated. 
We analyse several possible mechanisms by which the New York and London Stock 
exchanges could have been integrated. Firstly, we analyse the co-movement between US and 
UK stocks on NYSE and LSE respectively, to analyze whether domestic assets tended to be 
affected in the same way by some common factor. The second approach considers whether 
controlling for different characteristics in stocks, such as their size, yield or industry, had an 
impact. The third focuses on the role played by international listings on LSE, to determine 
                                                 
28
 Le Bris ‘Shocks Impact’. Hekimian and Le Bris 'US Crashes' also look for contagion between US and French 
stocks after the 1929 Wall Street Crash using adjusted correlation coefficients. 
29
 Pukthuanthong and Roll, ‘Global market integration,’ p.219 
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whether companies with greater exposure to the US economy moved in line with those listed 
on NYSE. The fourth examines those cross-listed stocks which were traded on both LSE and 
NYSE, to evaluate how closely the two exchanges were integrated when pricing the same 
assets. 
Our results suggest that there was little integration between domestic stocks from the 
UK and USA. An examination of the historical context also suggests that the prices of 
domestic stocks on both exchanges showed little evidence of co-movement. Any correlation 
which did occur may have been the result of domestic factors in each respective country, 
which happened to move both markets in the same direction. Controlling for the different 
characteristics of stocks makes little difference. For example, although companies listed on 
NYSE tended to be much larger, there is little evidence that a size factor helps to explain 
more of the returns. 
However, there was a higher level of integration between NYSE and those companies 
listed in London that operated primarily overseas. From the start of the sample period, in 
1825, companies whose main business operations were outside the UK were listed on LSE, 
and these stocks became increasingly more common as time progressed. By the 1870s the 
number of US securities listed on LSE became substantial, and were highly correlated with 
those traded on NYSE. A sub-group of these companies were cross-listed on both exchanges, 
and these stocks had very strong integration. This implies that investors trading via just the 
LSE could get exposure to almost exactly the same type of companies as those listed on 
NYSE.  
These results provide useful insights into the mechanisms by which asset markets 
integrate, an area which has received considerable attention recently
30
.  During this era, there 
                                                 
30
 Pukthuanthong and Roll, ‘Global market integration,’ Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, ‘International stock return 
comovements,’ Bekaert and Harvey, ‘Time-varying,’ Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, ‘Market integration,’ Bekaert, 
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was a sustained period which saw close economic ties and stable exchange rates based on the 
gold standard, very high levels of capital mobility, and strong communication links. 
However, domestic securities still did not move in similar ways. This would imply that even 
though there may be strong links between different markets, this does not necessarily lead to 
greater integration. Much higher levels of co-movement were experienced by those 
companies which had an international focus. This finding may help to explain why greater 
integration has been observed in equity markets in recent decades
31
. Firms have become ever 
more international, and tend to be more exposed to global factors as a result, meaning that 
they tend to co-move with each other more. The rise in integration may therefore reflect 
greater fundamental interdependence amongst firms, rather than some form of financial 
market contagion
32
.  
From an historical point of view, it also provides an important limit to the view that 
pre-World War 1 was the first era of globalization in terms of capital market integration.
33
 
The domestic securities on London and New York did not consistently co-move with each 
other, which would imply that their prices were still primarily affected by national 
considerations. The slightly higher correlation amongst securities immediately before World 
War 1, which has been noted in other studies
34
, was transitory. Similar levels of co-
movement had been reached in the 1830s and 1880s, and an examination of historical events 
suggests that these patterns could easily have been produced by domestic factors which 
happened to move stocks in the UK and USA in the same direction for a short period.  It was 
only the presence on London of international companies, particularly those which operated in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Harvey and Lumsdaine, ‘Dating the integration,’ Eiling and Gerard, ‘Emerging Equity,’ Lehkonen, ‘Stock 
market integration’. 
31
 Pukthuanthong and Roll, ‘Global market integration’. 
32
 Forbes and Rigobon, ‘No contagion’ 
33
 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘Globalisation and history’ p.225,  Obstfeld and Taylor, ‘Global Capital Markets’ 
p.121, Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, ‘Was there really’, Volosovych, ‘Market integration’, and Mauro, 
‘Emerging market spreads’. 
34
 Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst, ‘Long-term,’ p. 21, Obstfeld and Taylor, ‘Historical Perspective’ p.159, 
Moore, ‘World War One’. 
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the United States, which provided a deep connection between the markets. Our findings 
suggest that integration was deeper in some respects, but narrower in others, than some may 
have expected. It did not permeate throughout the exchanges, with domestic equities not 
moving closely together. However, at the other extreme, integration was not just limited to 
those identical assets which were traded on both exchanges. Having international stocks 
listed, even if they were not cross-listed with New York, provided a mechanism for 
integration. 
The paper also broadens our understanding of how both the London and New York 
Stock Exchanges developed historically
35
. It builds on previous work which has looked at the 
arbitrage opportunities involving cross-listed stocks
36
, and market correlations
37
, to consider 
how a range of risk factors, and sub-sectors within the market, may have played a role in 
connecting the exchanges. The results highlight the importance of international stocks listed 
on London, which have recently been examined by Grossman
38
. The analysis is also 
particularly enlightening with regards to the pricing of stocks on the NYSE
39
, as it reveals 
their exposure, or lack of, to UK and international factors. The findings also contribute to our 
understanding of the diversification opportunities available to investors in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries
40
. The lack of sustained correlation between domestic UK and US 
securities suggests that British investors would have benefitted from holding assets from both 
countries. In addition, they could easily have done this after 1870 via the London Stock 
Exchange, with little additional need to use the New York Stock Exchange.   
 
                                                 
35
 Michie, ‘London and New York,’ and Davis and Neal, ‘Micro rules,’ ‘How it all began,’ have looked at the 
evolution of the exchanges from an institutional perspective. 
36
 Neal, ‘International Capital Markets,’ ‘Disintegration,’ Michie, ‘London and New York,’ Hoag, ‘Atlantic 
telegraph’, Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’ and Garbade and Silber, ‘Technology’. 
37
 Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst ‘Long-term’ 
38
 Grossman, ‘Bloody Foreigners’. 
39
 Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, ‘NYSE 1815 to 1925’. 
40
 Edelstein, ‘Overseas investment’, Goetzmann and Ukhov, ‘British investment’, Chabot and Kurz, ‘Where the 
money was’, Edlinger, Merli, and Parent, ‘Optimal world portfolio’ 
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2. Data 
The data used in this analysis is obtained from a range of sources, as shown in Table 2, 
running on a monthly basis from 1825 to 1925. Data on British equities listed on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1825 and 1868 was provided by Acheson et al.
41
, who used the 
Course of the Exchange (COE) as their source. This has been supplemented for this paper 
with all foreign companies listed in the COE during this period, by manually inputting the 
data from the original source, and from Global Financial Data (GFD). All preference shares 
and corporate bonds during this period have also been obtained from GFD. The original 
source for the GFD information was The Times. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
 The Investors’ Monthly Manual (IMM) has been used to obtain data on companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1869 and 1925. It was somewhat more 
comprehensive than the earlier sources, with a jump in the number of securities included 
when this source became available. The original data has been inputted by the Yale 
International Center for Finance, and includes ordinary equities, preference shares, and 
corporate bonds.  
Data on ordinary equities and preference shares on the New York Stock Exchange has 
been obtained from the dataset compiled by Goetzmann et al.
42
, which has also been 
published by the Yale International Center for Finance. This has been supplemented with data 
on corporate bonds from Sylla, Wilson and Wright
43
 from 1825 to 1853, the New York Times, 
from 1854 to 1856, and Macaulay
44
 from 1857 to 1925.  
                                                 
41
 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’. 
42
 Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, ‘NYSE 1815 to 1925’. 
43
 Sylla, Wilson and Wright, ‘Trans-Atlantic capital markets’ 
44
 Macaulay, ‘Movements of Interest Rates’ 
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The number of securities, and the breakdown by asset type, are shown in Table 3, for 
both London and New York. The number of securities is generally much less for the NYSE 
than for the LSE, which may partly reflect a difference in how many stocks were reported in 
the original sources, but was also due to a lower number of securities being listed on New 
York than London. This was as a result of a conscious decision by New York to restrict their 
listings to just very large firms
45
. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
All share prices are converted to British Pounds. For the risk-free rate, the discount 
rate on prime bills in Britain is used and is obtained from Parliamentary Papers
46
 for 1825 to 
1855, from Nishimura
47
 for 1856 to 1869, and from Capie and Webber
48
 from 1870 to 1925.  
We have also been kindly provided with market indices for Paris by Le Bris and 
Hautcoeur
49
, and for Brussels by Annaert et al.
50
. These have allowed us to analyse if the 
integration between London and New York was as deep as the integration between London 
and other European exchanges. 
We calculate market indices using price-weighted returns, with the returns calculated 
as the change in price plus the dividend, divided by the previous price. The returns on all 
portfolios included in regressions are equally weighted averages of the log returns of 
individual assets. We also calculate just the capital gains on each portfolio, and report results 
using them for robustness. Asset and portfolio returns are winsorised to reduce the impact of 
outliers. This means that the most extreme negative returns were set to the level of returns at 
the 2.5
th
 percentile, and the most extreme positive returns were set to the level of returns at 
                                                 
45
 Michie, ‘London and New York’, p.185 
46
 Parliamentary Papers, ‘Bank Acts’. 
47
 Nishimura, ‘London money market’. 
48
 Capie and Webber, ‘Monetary history’. 
49
 Le Bris and Hautcoeur, ‘Paris Stock Exchange’ 
50
 Annaert et al. ‘Brussels Stock Exchange’, Annaert et al. 'Long-run stock returns', Annaert et al. 'New Belgian' 
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the 97.5
th
 percentile. More detail on the extensive data compilation and checking process is 
given in the Appendix. 
 
 
3. Background 
Trading in financial assets in London became regularized with the issue of government debt 
in the 1690s
51
. Most transactions were conducted in coffee houses during the eighteenth 
century, before a building was opened for trading in 1773
52
, and admission was controlled by 
the opening of a subscription room for members in 1801
53
. In New York, the market for 
trading securities became more regular with the issue of debt by the newly independent 
United States in the 1780s. A group of brokers signed the Buttonwood agreement in 1792, 
where they agreed to deal with each other first, and set minimum commission rates
54
. The 
New York Stock and Exchange Board was then formally established in 1817
55
. 
Market indices which have been constructed for this paper, for both New York and 
London, are shown in Figure 1 for the period from 1825 to 1925. Panel A shows the total 
returns, including dividend payments, whilst Panel B focuses on just the capital gains from 
share price movements. Each of the indices is price weighted, and the returns and capital 
gains are calculated after converting the prices of all securities to British pounds.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
 The total return indices, in Panel A of Figure 1, both rise substantially over time, 
highlighting the major role of dividends in rewarding investors, but due to the scale it can be 
difficult to detect short-term fluctuations. The capital gains indices, in Panel B of Figure 1, 
                                                 
51
 Michie, ‘London stock exchange’, p.18, Morgan and Thomas, ‘The stock exchange,’ p.21 
52
 Michie, ‘London stock exchange’, p.32, Morgan and Thomas, ‘The stock exchange,’ pp.67-68 
53
 Michie, ‘London stock exchange’, p.34 
54
 Sobel, ‘Big board’, pp.20-21 
55
 Sobel, ‘Big board’, p.30, Geisst, ‘Wall street’, p.20 
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illustrate these more clearly, and suggest that there were substantial differences in the 
movement of asset prices on London and New York. There tended to be less volatility on 
London, and it drifted downwards throughout the period. In comparison, New York often 
experienced substantial movements, and trended upwards over time. 
 In terms of connections between the markets, certain episodes may be highlighted. 
There was a decline in both markets in the late 1820s, with Britain suffering after the 1825-26 
crisis
56
. New York experienced its own difficulties, with an economic slowdown, and the 
failure of the Franklin Bank in 1825
57
.  In the 1830s the decision by President Jackson to not 
renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States led to a banking crisis and 
depression
58
. This may have contributed to the difficulties faced by the Bank of England 
between 1836 and 1839
59
, although other domestic factors also contributed. In Britain, the 
Railway Mania took hold in the 1840s
60
, with many European and Colonial railways coming 
to market, but American railroads were notable by their absence. 
 In the 1850s, railroad shares in the United States declined and led to problems in the 
financial sector in 1857
61
. This has been referred to as the first global crisis, with difficulties 
on both sides of the Atlantic, although Britain had been experiencing its own problems 
anyway
62
. The American Civil War in the early 1860s led to major volatility in New York, 
but Britain remained neutral and asset prices in London were fairly stable.  
With the laying of the transatlantic telegraph cable in 1866, there was almost 
instantaneous communication between the two cities. The 1870s saw the beginning of an 
                                                 
56
 Neal, ‘Financial crisis of 1825’, Haupert, ‘Panic of 1825’ 
57
 Geisst, ‘Wall street’, p.30 
58
 Walton and Rockoff, ‘American Economy’, pp.258-266, Rousseau, ‘Jacksonian’, Timberlake, ‘Panic of 
1837’, pp. 514-516, Temin, ‘Jacksonian’, pp. 113-171, Wallis, ‘Crisis of 1839’ 
59
 Temin, ‘Jacksonian’, pp. 137-147, Gayer, Schwartz and Rostow, ‘Growth and fluctuation’, p.243-244 
60
 Campbell, ‘Myopic rationality’ 
61
 Kelly and O Grada, ‘Market Contagion’, O Grada and White, ‘Panics’, Calomiris and Schweikart, ‘Panic of 
1857’, Sobel, ‘Big board’, p.61 
62
 Rockoff, ‘Crisis of 1857’, Hughes, ‘Commercial crisis of 1857’ 
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expansion in the number of foreign stocks listed on London
63
, many of which were from the 
United States. There were also periodic crises in both markets, but little evidence of 
substantial transmission between London and New York. In Britain, problems arose after the 
failure of Overend and Gurney in 1866
64
, and the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878
65
. In the 
United States, Jay Cooke failed in 1873
66
, and Grant and Ward in 1884
67
. 
In 1890, London was affected by a deterioration in the Argentine economy which led 
to difficulties for Barings
68
, who had underwritten some of these issues. In New York, some 
brokerages experienced difficulties during the summer of 1890
69
, but NYSE was still almost 
entirely without South American issues
70
. However, the United States experienced its own 
problems in 1893, following the Sherman Silver Purchase Act
71
, which soon led to a serious 
reduction in the reserves of gold within the United States. There was a sustained bull run in 
New York between the start of 1895 and the end of 1906, but London remained fairly stable. 
In 1907, another crisis hit New York with the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust
72
, and prices 
also declined somewhat in London.  
 With the outbreak of war in July 1914, the stock exchanges in Continental Europe 
began to close. This was followed by London, and then New York
73
. When New York 
reopened several months later it went on to boom, until the United States entered the war in 
April 1917, and then declined. On the contrary, prices in London declined until early 1917, 
                                                 
63
 Grossman, ‘Bloody Foreigners’ 
64
 Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini, ‘Bagehot for beginners’ 
65
 Acheson and Turner, ‘City of Glasgow’ 
66
 Mixon, ‘Crisis of 1873’, Glasner, ‘Crisis of 1873’ 
67
 Geisst, ‘Wall Street’, p. 103-104, Sobel, ‘Big board’, p.118 
68
 Morgan and Thomas, ‘The stock exchange’, p.95, Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Baring crisis’, Eichengreen, 
‘Mexican mirror’, Triner and Wandschneider, ‘Brazilian’ 
69
 Sobel, ‘Big board’, p.133 
70
 Michie, ‘London and New York’, p.241 
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but then started to rise. As the war ended, price rises were evident on both exchanges. The 
years of 1920 and 1921 saw declines on both markets, but both grew strongly between the 
start of 1922 and the end of 1925. 
 
 
4. Domestic Stocks 
To analyse the integration between London and New York we focus on several different 
mechanisms by which it could have occurred. The first measure of integration to be examined 
is the connection between US firms traded in New York, and UK firms traded in London. 
This will provide insights into whether the domestic securities in both countries moved in 
similar ways. Equally-weighted market returns were calculated for NYSE and LSE 
respectively, for each month of the sample period.  The returns on the New York market 
index were then regressed against the returns on the London market index. One lag and lead 
of the independent variable are also included to control for the time lags in information 
moving across the Atlantic at the start of the sample period. Cross-listed securities, those 
which were listed on both exchanges, are excluded from the analysis in this section and the 
next few sections, but are examined separately later. 
The regressions were performed using a rolling window of 120 observations, 
equivalent to 10 years of monthly data
74
. The R
2
 from each of these rolling regressions is 
reported in Figure 2, centred around the midpoint of each regression’s sample period. For 
example, the R
2 
from the
 
1826-1835 regression is reported in 1830, and the R
2 
from the 1916-
1925 regression is reported in 1920. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
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The results suggest that the co-movement between securities on London and New York 
varied substantially over time, but there was not a secular increase in integration over the 
sample period. The R
2
 for 1827-37 is very similar to the cyclical peaks in co-movement 
which occurred between 1879-89 and 1904-14. There are also several periods when there is 
close to zero co-movement, 1863-74, 1895-1905, and 1908-19. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the periods where integration was highest 
and lowest, showing economic growth, government bond yields, and exchange rate volatility 
within each period. There does not appear to be a clear pattern as to what may cause 
integration. Average returns on securities are sometimes similar on average during peak 
integration, but they can also be similar on average during troughs in integration, even though 
they may have moved in different ways around this average. Correlations in GDP growth 
between the US and UK are fairly similar regardless of whether there was relatively high or 
low asset market integration. A similar result appears for interest rates.  
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
It has been suggested that capital mobility may play an important role in capital 
market integration
75
. However, there were extremely few restrictions on capital movement 
for almost the entire period. The major exception was World War I when the British 
government imposed controls. There was a dip in integration during this period, but this 
could also be explained by differing exposures of securities in both countries to the war. Prior 
to US entry into the war in 1917, security prices on London declined whilst those in New 
York increased. After US entry, London prices increased, whilst New York prices declined. 
Another short period of restricted capital movement occurred in 1906, when the Bank of 
England stopped discounting US bills
76
. This was an attempt to reduce the outflow of gold 
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which came when British insurance companies compensated those who had suffered loss in 
the San Francisco earthquake.  There is little evidence to suggest that this restriction on 
capital mobility led to reduced integration as it fell within the period of 1904 to 1914, one of 
the periods when R
2
 was at its highest. 
A similar problem occurs from a suggestion that integration was aided by exchange 
rate stability. In support of this hypothesis, the two periods involving the US Civil War and 
World War I were marked by higher exchange rate volatility. However, the third period of 
low integration occurred in the midst of the gold standard era.  
The improved communications between London and New York, as a result of the 
laying of the transatlantic telegraph in 1866, may have improved the consistency of pricing of 
cross listed assets
77
 which will be considered in a later section. With two peaks in integration 
after this opening it could also be regarded as promoting integration between different assets. 
However, the low integration in 1895-1905 and 1908-1919, opposes this conclusion. 
Two of the periods of least integration, the US Civil War era and World War I, 
included major conflicts which affected each country differently. During the US Civil War 
the UK remained neutral. During World War I, the US remained neutral until 1917. However, 
the third period of low integration occurred from 1895 to 1905. Britain fought the Boer War 
during this period, but this is unlikely to have been sizable enough to explain the divergence 
between London and New York. It was a sustained bull run in New York, which did not 
occur in London, which led to such low integration at this time. Consequently, differing 
exposure to war may help to explain why companies in each country moved in different 
ways, but this was not the only reason for low integration. 
More generally, it may have been that the periods of higher integration merely 
occurred because of temporary correlations in the economic conditions in the UK and US. 
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The level of integration did not remain stable for sustained periods. It rose and fell quite 
dramatically throughout the sample, as shown in Figure 2, suggesting that there was not an 
equilibrium level of integration that it remained around. Also, the narrative of events 
discussed in the previous section, suggests that even when prices did move in the same 
direction, there was little suggestion of common exposure to the same events. 
 
5. Characteristics 
Rather than using the market as a whole, Fama and French
78
 have suggested using five risk 
factors for explaining the returns on bonds and stocks. The first factor, Term, is the difference 
in returns due to the term structure of interest rates. It is calculated as the difference between 
the risk-free rate and the return on long-term high quality government bonds. In our paper 
this is the difference between the returns from short-term first class bills, and long-term 
British government Consols.  
The second factor, Def, is the difference in returns due to default risk, and is 
calculated as the difference between safe government bonds and risky corporate bonds. We 
calculate this as the difference between the returns on British government Consols and a 
portfolio of all corporate debt listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
The other three factors focus on equities. The market return of all equities is 
calculated, and the risk-free is subtracted from it. Fama and French
79
 have found that size and 
the relative value of a company are also determinants of returns.  Other research has 
examined if these factors were significant historically. Turner and Ye
80
 have found that for 
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1825 to 1870 there was a value premium, but little evidence of a size premium. Similarly, 
Grossman
81
 has found that for 1869 to 1929, value was significant, but size was not. 
 Size could have been important as firms listed on New York tended to be larger than 
those listed on London. Michie has calculated that by 1914 the average size of firms listed on 
New York was five times that of London
82
. To construct the size factor, all of the UK equities 
on the London Stock Exchange were categorized as either Small or Big based on whether 
their market capitalization was above or below the median at the end of the previous year. 
Equally weighted portfolios of returns were then calculated for each month based on this 
categorization. The factor SMB was constructed as the returns on the Small portfolio Minus 
the Big portfolio. 
 A factor was also constructed based on whether an asset could be classified as a value 
stock. Fama and French
83
 use the book equity to market equity ratio as the basis for 
calculating this. However, this variable is not available during this period so we follow 
Turner and Ye
84
, and Grossman
85
, in using the dividend yield as a proxy. The yield on 
investments was an important feature during this era, with the yield on Consols providing a 
benchmark for low risk investments. Each UK equity listed on London was categorized as 
being either High or Low yield, depending on whether it was above or below the median 
yield at the end of the previous year. Companies which did not pay dividends are necessarily 
excluded as they always had a dividend of zero, which does not reveal anything about their 
pricing
86
. The monthly returns on the High and Low yield portfolios were calculated as 
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equally weighted averages of their constituent companies, and the HML factor was 
constructed as High Minus Low. 
We also construct another factor based on the railway industry, as both New York and 
London hosted numerous railways, as shown in Table 3. If railway, or non-railway, share 
prices tended to move similarly, regardless of where they were located, prices may have been 
partially explained by this industry factor. The Rail factor is calculated as the equally 
weighted returns of UK railway companies listed in London, minus the equally weighted 
return of all other UK companies listed on London. 
We also calculate a factor based on whether companies were likely to export goods. 
Returns on UK firms which operated in commercial and industrial sectors where products 
could have been traded internationally
87
, were compared to those where exporting would 
have been less likely
88
, to create the Export factor. It is possible that New York may have 
moved more like the UK firms which were more likely to export goods, as these firms may 
have been more exposed to international factors. Cross-listed securities are excluded from all 
of these factors.  
The results of regressions for the entire sample period are shown in Table 5. The 
results suggest that there is little additional explanatory power from these other risk factors. 
The market factor, which is highly significant, provides an adjusted R
2
 of 0.072 across the 
whole period. Although the Rail factor is significant, indicating that New York moved more 
like non-railways on London, there is little increase in explanatory power. The Export factor 
is also significant, indicating that New York moved more like those UK firms in industries 
which were more affected by international trade, and the adjusted R
2 
increases slightly. 
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However, even with the inclusion of all of the additional factors the adjusted R
2 
is little 
changed at 0.097. 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
Figure 3 charts the adjusted R
2
 of the rolling regressions when the characteristic 
factors are incorporated. The inclusion of these factors increases the adjusted R
2
 slightly, 
particularly in the first quarter of the sample. Integration was not sustained for any 
considerable period, and the peaks and troughs are almost identical as when only the market 
factor is included. This suggests that New York did not co-move with particular sub-sections 
of UK securities listed on London. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
To place these results in context, it may be useful to compare them with an analysis of 
how integrated London was with other European exchanges. Le Bris and Hautecour
89
 have 
kindly provided us with their market index for the Paris Stock Exchange, beginning in 1854. 
Annaert et al.
90
 have also been very helpful in providing their index for the Brussels Stock 
Exchange, beginning in 1832. We analyse how exposed these markets were to our London 
risk factors in Table 6. We also re-run our analysis for New York for the same time periods, 
and focus on just ordinary equities, to be consistent with the other European indices. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6 >> 
We find very similar results in terms of the explanatory power, with R
2
 around 10% 
for each of the exchanges. We also repeat our rolling regressions in Figure 4. The patterns are 
somewhat similar, although they diverge at times which may be expected. For example, New 
York has a lower R
2
 with London, than the other European exchanges do, during the U.S. 
Civil War, and World War I. Nevertheless, the main conclusion is that, controlling for the 
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characteristics of securities, London was integrated with New York, Paris and Brussels to 
similar degrees. There was not really a sustained or high level of integration with any of the 
exchanges. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
To examine whether there were differences between security types, Table 7 analyses 
NYSE equities (ordinary shares) and non-equities (preference shares and bonds) separately. 
The returns on NYSE equities are explained using the returns on LSE equities in the first 
column giving an R
2
 of 0.072, and when the other risk factors are included in the third 
column this rises to 0.098. These results are very similar to the results in Table 5 when all 
NYSE securities are analysed together. The returns on NYSE non-equities, shown in column 
2, is significantly related to changes in the term structure of interest rates, and the default risk 
of corporate bonds in London, but the R
2
 is very low at 0.015. When other risk factors are 
included, in the fourth column, it can be seen that the return on NYSE non-equities is also 
significantly related to the return on LSE equities and railways, and the R
2 
rises to 0.057. 
Given the common patterns explaining both NYSE equities and non-equities it seems 
justified to include all of the NYSE securities in a single portfolio for the rest of the analysis. 
<< INSERT TABLE 7 >> 
 
6. Foreign Listings 
Although New York almost exclusively listed companies based in the USA
91
, London had a 
large number of foreign firms listed. This was evident from the beginning of the sample 
period in 1825, but became more pronounced after 1870
92
. Bekaert et al.
93
 have noted that 
                                                 
91
 Moore ‘World Financial Markets’, p. 36, notes only 3 foreign assets were listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange in 1900. 
92
 Grossman, ‘Bloody Foreigners’, analyses the growth in listings and their returns. Edelstein, ‘Realized rates’, 
‘Overseas investment’ assesses whether overseas investment was optimal for British investors. Chambers, 
‘Geography and capital’, finds that the listing of US railroads in London became much more common after 
 
 23 
 
regional factors may play a role in asset pricing, but suggests that this implies a weaker 
degree of interdependence than exposure to global factors. By analyzing the co-movement of 
New York with the foreign companies listed on London we can examine how much influence 
region-specific considerations had. 
 We construct three factors, each consisting of firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The first, NonUK, consists of all firms with operations mainly outside the UK. 
The second, Americas, consists of all firms operating in either North or South America. The 
third, USA, includes those firms focused in the United States. To avoid problems of 
multicollinearity, we orthogonalise each of the international market factors by regressing it 
against the UK market factor. 
Cross-listed companies, which were traded on both exchanges, could give the 
appearance of higher integration, simply because some of the assets which were being traded 
were identical. To deal with this, we exclude them from this analysis, and deal with them 
separately in the next section. Consequently, all of the factors discussed here exclude cross-
listed stocks, so for example, the USA factor consists of those firms operating in the United 
States which were listed on London but not on New York. It completely excludes companies 
which have any securities trading on both exchanges. For example, if a stock for Company 
ABC was listed in New York, but a bond for Company ABC was listed in London, then 
Company ABC is completely removed from this analysis. Only 27% of the companies in this 
USA factor are railways. This is largely because it was the railways which were most likely 
to cross-list, and are consequently removed from this section. The majority of companies in 
this factor are therefore non-railways, and include companies from industries such as 
Breweries, Land and Mortgages, Mines, Oil and Telegraph.  
                                                                                                                                                        
1870, and may have been driven by regional considerations.  Hawkins, ‘American boomers’ provides insights 
into the promotion of overseas firms. 
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There are less than 10 US firms in our dataset listed in London before 1870, so the 
analysis is run just from 1870 onwards for the USA factor. After this period the US firms 
grew to represent a major proportion of market capitalization, reaching about 40 per cent of 
the value of all the securities listed in London in 1915, as shown in Figure 5. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
The regressions in Table 8 show the exposure of New York to each of the 
international factors. The results are shown for the full sample period, 1825-1925, and for the 
period when the number of international listings became more substantial, 1870-1925.  
The results imply that New York did not show particularly strong integration with 
either NonUK or Americas firms. For the full sample period, the adjusted R
2
 remains almost 
unchanged, being 0.097 for the factors based on UK securities, and also 0.097 with a factor 
for all foreign stocks, rising to 0.107 for just those securities based in the Americas. For the 
period after 1870, the adjusted R
2
 increases from 0.132, to 0.154 and 0.214 respectively.  
<< INSERT TABLE 8 >> 
However, USA shows up as being a highly significant factor, and increases the 
explanatory power considerably, to 0.343, for the post-1870 period. This suggests that much 
of the movement in New York was driven by country-specific considerations in the United 
States, rather than more general regional factors. To press this further we construct SMB and 
HML factors based only on US firms listed on London. We split US firms listed on London 
into Small and Big, High and Low Yield, as was done for the UK factors. We orthogonalise 
each US factor by regressing it against the relevant UK factor and using the residual from this 
as the US-specific factor
94
. The adjusted R
2
 from the post-1870 period increases further to 
0.420 with the inclusion of these factors. 
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Moving window regressions are then run, using both the UK and US factors to 
explain the returns on NYSE. The results are shown in Figure 6. The R
2
 from these 
regressions are much higher than for the UK factors alone, consistently explaining at least 40 
per cent of NYSE returns, reaching 70 per cent at the peak. These results suggest that rather 
than showing integration with the broad population of London listed firms, or even foreign 
firms, the co-movement is restricted to just the segment of the London market consisting of 
US firms, representing a weaker form of integration. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 6 >> 
 As a robustness check we have also repeated all of our analysis excluding dividends, 
and only look at capital gains, in Table 9. We find very similar results. Dividends are being 
added to both dependent and independent variables which will increase the mean of these 
variables. However, as dividends tend to be fairly stable it has little impact on the deviations 
of the observations from the mean, and consequently there is little change in the explanatory 
power of the regressions. 
<< INSERT TABLE 9 >> 
 
7. Cross-Listed Stocks 
In this section, we examine those stocks which were listed on both markets simultaneously. 
The datasets for both exchanges were manually compared, and we included any asset which 
traded on both markets for at least 60 months. The identity of the 36 securities that were 
found, and the years in which they were listed in our sample for both the London and New 
York Stock Exchanges, is shown in Table 10. The earliest sustained cross-listing in our 
sample period is the Second Bank of the United States, which has already been analysed by 
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Sylla, Wilson and Wright
95
, which we include from the start of our sample period in 1825. 
The number of cross-listings became much more common from the 1880s and 1890s. There 
were 17 assets in our sample which were cross-listed at the end of our analysis period in 
1925. 
<< INSERT TABLE 10 >> 
 Examples of the prices of cross-listed stocks are shown in Figure 7, focusing on the 
Rock Island Railroad in Panel A, and the New York Central and Hudson River (7% Bonds) 
in Panel B. The thick double line illustrates the price in New York, whilst the single dotted 
line shows the price in London, both converted to British Pounds. For both assets, there does 
not appear to be major deviations between the exchanges.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 7 >> 
For each of the cross-listed securities, only months in which they were traded on both 
exchanges are included. This ensures that deviations do not appear because of a lack of 
trading in one of the markets. We also exclude prices under 2 British pounds, as small 
deviations in nominal prices can appear large when expressed in percentage terms. For 
example, prices of 1.00 on one market, and 1.10 on the other could easily be the result of bid-
ask spreads, but would appear to be a 10 per cent deviation in prices. 
For each of the months the ratio of the log of the price in New York to the log of the 
price in London was calculated, and is reported in Table 10. The mean of this ratio for each 
asset is very close to 1.00, indicating very similar pricing on both exchanges on average. The 
standard deviations of price ratio for some stocks indicate that the prices could often deviate 
temporarily between the exchanges, although some of this may have been due to bid-ask 
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spreads, trades occurring at different times within the month, or variations in the dollar-pound 
exchange rate during the month. 
 Tests of cointegration were also conducted, with the log of the price level in New 
York regressed against the log of the price level in London
96
. The residual from this 
regression was then tested for a unit root, using an Augmented Dickey Fuller test. For each 
asset the residual is highly significant, indicating that there was no unit root, and confirming 
that the prices in New York and London cointegrated.  
 A regression is then conducted for each asset, explaining the return in New York 
using the current, past and future monthly return in London. The lag of the residual from the 
cointegrating relationship is also included in this regression to form an Error Correction 
Model, so that if prices deviated from parity during the previous month they could be 
corrected, and this could help to explain the return during the current month.  
The R
2
 from this regression for each asset is shown in Table 9, which also shows the 
results when the analysis is repeated excluding dividends. The R
2
 for each asset is very high, 
with almost all exceeding 60%. The lowest is the New York Central and Hudson River (7% 
Bonds), which has been illustrated in Panel B of Figure 7. Even for this asset there does not 
seem to be major deviations from parity. Across time, there does not seem to be much change 
in the consistency of pricing, with the earliest cross-listing, the Second Bank of the United 
States having similar results to the later cross-listings, although it should be noted that we 
have controlled for lags to account for the longer time it took to deliver information across 
the Atlantic in the early years. 
 These results suggest a strong similarity in pricing for assets which were traded 
simultaneously on the London and New York Stock Exchanges. Prices could deviate from 
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parity temporarily, but this can also be the case in the modern era
97
. Using this narrow view 
of integration, which examines only the exact same asset on two markets, it therefore appears 
that there was strong integration between LSE and NYSE. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the integration between securities listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, and those listed on the London Stock Exchange, between 1825 and 1925. The 
pattern of co-movement between domestic securities listed on each exchange suggests that 
they did not consistently move in the same direction. Controlling for the different 
characteristics of stocks on both exchanges does not make much difference to this result. 
There was a much stronger pattern of co-movement between NYSE and the international 
stocks which were listed on LSE, particularly with those firms operating in the United States, 
and those cross listed on both exchanges. 
This has implications for our understanding of how deeply integrated the world 
economy was before World War I. Companies based in the UK and US did not experience 
similar changes in their asset prices at similar times. If asset prices reflect discounted cash 
flows, this result implies that the expected performance of companies in each country were 
not affected by common factors. 
It also has broader implications for our understanding of the process of globalisation, 
and what factors may be responsible for integration. The existence of the gold standard, and 
almost instantaneous communication, did not lead to highly integrated markets. The most 
important mechanism for connecting the exchanges was the presence of companies which 
had a strong international focus.  
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The chronology of integration may be conceptualized as a move from isolation, to 
integrated pricing of the same securities, and then eventually to integration via the rise of 
multiproduct firms trading internationally. In the early period there were few links between 
the exchanges. The domestic securities on each market did not move closely together, and 
there were few international listings. Consistent with Sylla, Wilson and Wright
98
 we find 
consistency of pricing for those assets which were cross-listed at this time, but they were few 
in number. As time progressed the number of international listings and cross-listed firms 
increased. This would eventually be followed, in the modern era, by the rise of multinational 
firms which trade internationally, and which may be the major factor driving capital market 
integration in recent years.  
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Appendix: Data Compilation 
 
London Stock Exchange 
Data on share prices, dividends, par values, uncalled capital and the number of shares are 
reported in the Course of the Exchange, and these have been obtained for domestic equities 
from Acheson et al.
99
, and manually inputted for foreign equities from the Course of the 
Exchange, for 1825 to 1868. The financial data provider, Global Financial Data, also have 
asset pricing data for some other equities, preference shares, and corporate bonds which have 
been obtained from The Times and the early editions of the Investor’s Monthly Manual 
(IMM) from 1864 to 1868. They do not include dividend or share characteristic data so these 
are obtained where available from the paper versions of the IMM in these years. 
From 1869 the monthly editions of the IMM have been inputted by Yale International 
Center for Finance. It reports data on asset prices, dividends, par values, uncalled capital and 
the number of shares, and includes ordinary equities, preference shares and corporate bonds. 
This database is of great benefit, but it did require considerable additional data checking. To 
correct for misprints, any occasion where the share price was more than double, or less than 
half, both the previous and the subsequent price then the price in the anomalous month is 
removed. The size of the company is sometimes reported in terms of the number of shares, 
but at other times is reported in term of total value. These two reporting methods are 
distinguished, and converted so that all observations are reported in terms of total value. 
 The dividend yield is directly reported in the IMM after 1878. For companies with a 
missing dividend yield, details of the last four dividend payments are checked to ensure that 
there was no dividend payment made, and the yield is set to zero. Where dividend payments 
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were made but no yield is reported, i.e. for all companies before 1878, and for a small 
number after this date, the dividend per share is used to work out a dividend yield. 
 The IMM includes companies listed on the many regional exchanges of the UK 
during this era. As the focus of this research is on the London Stock Exchange, only those 
firms listed as being traded in London, or where no exchange is specified, are included.  
 For all of the data, from 1825 to 1925, substantial time was also taken in terms of 
classification. It was common for one company to issue multiple assets. To account for this, 
all assets have been manually sorted and grouped into companies. Every asset has also been 
manually categorized as debt, preference or equity, based on information provided in the 
company and security descriptions. The industry of each company was also coded, with a 
variable created specifically to identify railways. The name of every company was also 
manually examined to determine whether it was likely to operate outside the UK. When the 
name included a place, such as a city, state, or country, the company was deemed to operate 
extensively within that country, and each company is then classified by region.  
  
New York Stock Exchange 
Data on ordinary equity and preference shares on the New York Stock Exchange have been 
obtained from Goetzmann et al.
100
 This data contains monthly share prices, which are again 
checked for misprints, by excluding those whose price was more than double, or less than 
half, both the previous and subsequent prices. Dividends are reported, where available, up to 
1870 and the dividend yield is calculated from this. After 1870, individual company level 
dividends are not available, so the dividend yield of the Cowles Index
101
 is used as a proxy of 
the dividend yield of this index. Goetzmann et al.
102
 show that a share price index constructed 
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using this data is highly correlated with the Cowles Index, so the dividend yield should also 
be very similar.  
 Each company could issue multiple securities, so all securities were manually sorted 
and coded into companies. There are no bonds included in the dataset, and preference shares 
are identified based on the security name.  The remainder are classified as equity. Railroad 
companies are identified based on the name of the company, and usually bear the suffix 
“RR”. All companies are also checked against the Appendix to the Cowles Commission 
Report
103
, which lists companies by industry. 
 For corporate bonds we use data provided by Sylla, Wilson and Wright.
104
 from 1825 
to 1853. This dataset often reports both bid and ask prices so we calculate the mid-point. We 
manually input data on corporate bonds from the New York Times between 1854 and 1856. 
Macaulay’s105 Appendix on Railroad Bond Yields is used from 1857 to 1925. These are 
reported as Yields to Maturity, but the coupon rate and maturity date of each bond is also 
given, allowing us to calculate the implied price of the bond. As Macaulay does not 
distinguish which exchange the bonds are traded on, we compare the company names with 
those whose equities were traded on New York, according to Goetzmann et al.
106
, and restrict 
our sample to these bonds. With regards the representativeness of the Macauley data, analysis 
by Mishkin
107
 suggests that it performs well. Bernanke
108
 uses a measure based on Moody’s 
Baa Corporate bond rate to calculate interest rate spreads from 1919. Mishkin
109
 compares 
this with a measure created using Macauley data for when the two overlap, between 1919 and 
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104
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1935. The correlation between the two measures during this period is very high, at 0.88, 
which would suggest that the Macauley data should be reliable.  
 
 
Currency Conversion 
Stocks listed on New York are converted at the US Dollar to British Pounds exchange rate. 
Between 1825 and 1861 this is obtained from Smith and Cole
110
. From 1862 to 1878 the 
exchange rate is calculated by using the dollar price of gold in New York, obtained from 
Denzel et al.
111
, and the price of gold in London which was fixed. Between 1879 and 1913 
both countries maintained the gold standard, and the conversion from dollars to pounds is 
based on the par rate of exchange. Between 1914 and 1925 the exchange rate is obtained on a 
monthly basis from the Financial Times. Many of the American firms which were listed on 
the London Stock Exchange had their prices quoted in “dollars”. However, this was not 
actually equivalent to US dollars
112
. Before 1874, there were 4.44 London Stock Exchange 
“dollars” equivalent to one British Pound, but this changed to 5.00 London “dollars” 
thereafter
113
. 
 
Risk-free Rate 
In some of the calculations, the risk-free rate is needed as an input. Modern studies often 
proxy the risk-free rate as the yield on US Treasury Bonds. During this era, the yield on 
British government debt was almost always lower than US government debt, so it is the 
British rate which is used as a proxy. The discount rate on prime bills in Britain is used and is 
                                                 
110
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111
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112
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 34 
 
obtained from Parliamentary Papers
114
 for 1825 to 1855, from Nishimura
115
 for 1856 to 1869, 
and from Capie and Webber
116
 from 1870 to 1925. 
 
Consistency between London and New York 
Prices on NYSE prior to 1915 were reported as a percentage of their par value
117
. To ensure 
consistency between the exchanges, the prices of stocks on the LSE were converted so that 
they were also expressed as a percentage of par during this period. Data is not available for 
3.2 per cent of the months during the sample period. This may be because the exchanges were 
closed, such as during the latter half of 1914 due to World War I, or because no original 
sources could be found for that month. To ensure consistency, if data is missing for either 
London or New York, that month is excluded entirely. For the next month, capital gains and 
returns are calculated between the latest data, and the last available data. For example, the 
returns for the month ending January 1915, use the change in price between June 1914 and 
January 1915. 
Given the range of sources used, it was necessary to manually line up all of the 
securities to ensure a continuous dataset. This was done for each exchange individually, and 
cross-listed assets between London and New York were also matched. 
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Figure 1: Market Indices of 
London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1825-1925 
 
 
Panel A: Returns 
 
 
Panel B: Capital Gains 
 
Notes: Price-weighted indices reflect the performance of portfolios which hold one share of each asset listed on the 
respective stock exchanges. Returns include dividend payments, whilst capital gains reflect only share price changes.  
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Figure 2: Explanatory Power when NYSE Returns are  
Regressed against LSE Market Returns, 
Using Rolling Window Regressions 
 
 
 
Notes: The returns on a portfolio of US securities on NYSE are regressed against the returns on a portfolio of UK 
securities listed on LSE, and one lag and lead of this portfolio. Cross-listed securities are excluded. The returns of the 
portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities. Rolling regressions are performed using 120 
month windows. The midpoint of each window is shown, so the adjusted R2 shown for 1830 reflects a regression 
analyzing the 120 months between 1825 and 1835.  
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Figure 3: Explanatory Power when NYSE Returns are  
Regressed against LSE Market and Characteristic Factors,  
using Rolling Window Regressions 
 
 
Notes: The Market line shows the results from regressing returns on a portfolio of US equities on NYSE against the 
returns on a portfolio of UK equities on LSE. The Characteristics line shows the results from regressing the New 
York return minus the risk-free rate (NYSERf), against risk factors constructed from securities traded on London 
based on Term structure (Term), Default risk (Def), the Equity market return minus the risk-free rate (LSERf), size 
(SMB), yield (HML), and whether the company was a railway (Rail) or could potentially export (Export).  Cross-
listed securities are excluded. The returns of the portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities. 
Rolling regressions are performed using 120 month windows. The midpoint of each window is shown, so the adjusted 
R2 shown for 1830 reflects a regression analyzing the 120 months between 1825 and 1835.  
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Figure 4: Comparison of NYSE, Brussels and Paris  
against LSE Market and Characteristic Factors,  
using Rolling Window Regressions 
 
 
 
Notes: Returns on equity market indices for New York, Paris and Brussels, minus the risk-free rate, are regressed 
against risk factors constructed from securities traded on London based on Term structure (Term), Default risk (Def), 
the Equity market return minus the risk-free rate (LSERf), size (SMB), yield (HML), and whether the company was a 
railway (Rail) or could potentially export (Export).  Cross-listed securities are excluded. The returns of the portfolios 
are equally weighted averages of the individual securities. Rolling regressions are performed using 120 month 
windows. The midpoint of each window is shown, so the adjusted R2 shown for 1830 reflects a regression analyzing 
the 120 months between 1825 and 1835.  
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Figure 5: Market Value of US Companies listed on LSE 
as a Proportion of All Companies listed on LSE 
 
 
Notes: US securities are identified based on their company names. The market value for each security is calculated as the number 
of shares multiplied by the asset price. Prices quoted in dollars are converted to British pounds. 
 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1825 1833 1841 1851 1859 1869 1877 1885 1894 1902 1911 1920
%
 o
f 
 L
S
E
M
a
rk
et
 C
a
p
it
a
li
sa
ti
o
n
 
 47 
 
Figure 6: Explanatory Power of NYSE Returns by  
LSE UK and US Factors, using Rolling Window Regressions 
 
 
Notes: The Market line shows the results from regressing returns on a portfolio of US equities on NYSE against the 
returns on a portfolio of UK equities on LSE. The Characteristics line shows the results from regressing the New 
York return minus the risk-free rate (NYSERf), against risk factors constructed from securities traded on London 
based on Term structure (Term), Default risk (Def), the Equity market return minus the risk-free rate (LSERf), size 
(SMB), yield (HML), and whether the company was a railway (Rail) or could potentially export (Export). The USA 
line shows the results from a regression which also includes a portfolio of US securities listed on LSE, and SMB and 
HML for US equities. Cross-listed securities are excluded. The returns of the portfolios are equally weighted averages 
of the individual securities. Rolling regressions are performed using 120 month windows. The midpoint of each 
window is shown, so the adjusted R2 shown for 1830 reflects a regression analyzing the 120 months between 1825 
and 1835.  
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Figure 7: Prices of Assets listed on both 
London and New York Stock Exchanges 
 
 
Panel A: Rock Island Railroad 
 
 
Panel B: New York Central and Hudson River (7% Bonds) 
 
Notes: The prices on NYSE and LSE for these cross-listed assets are recorded each month, and converted 
to British Pounds 
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Table 1: Comparison of Stock Exchange Sizes 
 
Total 
Market Cap 
(£m) 
Number of 
Equities 
Average 
Market Cap  
per Equity 
(£m) 
 Panel A: Size in 1925 
London 5,381 2,381 2.26 
New York 4,721 548 8.61 
Berlin 708 1,050 0.67 
Paris 468 243 1.93 
Amsterdam 358 581 0.62 
Canada 302 234 1.29 
Tokyo 188 91 2.07 
 Panel B: Size in 1903 
London 2,613 1,379 1.89 
New York 1,548 294 5.27 
Paris 554 157 3.53 
Berlin 474 755 0.63 
Johannesburg 216 127 1.70 
Vienna 177 186 0.95 
Amsterdam 136 286 0.48 
Notes: Adapted from Moore ‘World Financial Markets’, Tables 2 and 4. Includes ordinary 
equity and preference shares but not corporate debt. 
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Table 2: Data Sources 
 
 London New York 
   
Equities 1825-1868: Acheson et al.,  
   ‘British Stock Market Returns’; 
   Course of the Exchange; 
   Global Financial Data 
 
 
1869-1925: Investor’s Monthly Manual  
   (Yale ICF) 
 
 
1825-1925: Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, 
   ‘NYSE 1815 to 1925’ 
Preference 1825-1868: The Times  
   (Global Financial Data) 
 
1869-1925: Investor’s Monthly Manual  
   (Yale ICF) 
 
 
 
1825-1925: Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, 
‘NYSE 1815 to 1925’ 
Bonds 1825-1868: The Times  
   (Global Financial Data) 
 
1869-1925: Investor’s Monthly Manual  
   (Yale ICF) 
 
1825-1853: Sylla, Wilson and Wright,  
   ‘Early US Securities Prices’ 
 
1853-1856: New York Times 
 
1857-1925: Macaulay  
   ‘Movements of Interest Rates’ 
 
 Miscellaneous Data 
Currencies 1825-1861 Smith and Cole, ‘Fluctuations’ 
1862-1878 Denzel, Schneider, and Schwarzer, ‘Currencies’ 
1879-1913 Gold Standard  
1914-1925 Financial Times 
 
Risk-free rate 1825-1855: Parliamentary Papers, ‘Bank Acts’. 
1856-1869: Nishimura, ‘London money market’. 
1870-1925: Capie and Webber, ‘Monetary history’. 
 
International  Paris: Le Bris and Hautcoeur, ‘Paris Stock Exchange’ 
 
Brussels: Annaert et al. ‘Brussels Stock Exchange’ 
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Table 3: Composition of Sample 
 
  London  New York 
    % of securities which were:    % of securities which were: 
Year 
 
Number of 
Securities 
 
Railways 
Ordinary 
Equity 
Preference 
Shares 
Debt 
 
Number of 
Securities 
 
Railways 
Ordinary 
Equity 
Preference 
Shares 
Debt 
1825 
 
168  1.2% 96.4% 0.0% 3.6% 
 
42  0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1835 
 
224  10.7% 96.0% 0.0% 4.0% 
 
74  12.2% 98.6% 0.0% 1.4% 
1845 
 
279  53.0% 96.8% 1.4% 1.8% 
 
73  16.4% 97.3% 0.0% 2.7% 
1855 
 
354  50.8% 70.3% 14.4% 15.3% 
 
162  42.0% 84.0% 0.0% 16.0% 
1865 
 
715  58.2% 48.1% 16.6% 35.2% 
 
170  47.6% 91.2% 0.6% 8.2% 
1875 
 
1205  48.8% 54.9% 15.7% 29.4% 
 
69  76.8% 73.9% 2.9% 23.2% 
1885 
 
1423  44.8% 53.4% 14.2% 32.4% 
 
136  70.6% 72.1% 9.6% 18.4% 
1895 
 
2268  36.8% 45.4% 17.5% 37.1% 
 
104  74.0% 67.3% 6.7% 26.0% 
1905 
 
2773  27.4% 40.1% 24.7% 35.2% 
 
115  65.2% 60.9% 18.3% 20.9% 
1915 
 
2933  27.7% 39.1% 24.6% 36.2% 
 
119  63.0% 57.1% 22.7% 20.2% 
1925 
 
2804  20.4% 42.0% 25.3% 32.7% 
 
100  60.0% 58.0% 20.0% 22.0% 
Notes: Calculated from sample which has been constructed from the sources discussed in Table 2 and the Appendix.   
 52 
 
 
Table 4: Peaks and Troughs of Synchronicity between  
London and New York Market Returns 
 
                 
Years  Monthly Returns  GDP Growth  Interest Rates  Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
US on 
NYSE 
UK on 
LSE 
Adj. 
R
2
 
 US UK Correl  US UK Correl  Mean Std. Dev 
                 
  Panel A: Peaks in Integration 
1827 1837  0.11% 0.15% 0.25  4.22 2.14 0.21 
 
 5.44 3.30 -0.58 
 
 4.86 0.11 
1879 1889  0.55% 0.27% 0.22  6.04 1.81 0.23 
 
 4.43 2.72 0.71 
 
 4.85 0.01 
1904 1914  0.05% 0.22% 0.22  1.46 1.88 0.70 
 
 4.41 2.92 0.89 
 
 4.87 0.02 
  Panel B: Troughs in Integration 
1863 1874  0.55% 0.38% -0.02  3.49 2.67 -0.01 
 
 6.33 3.12 0.10 
 
 6.60 1.26 
1895 1905  0.79% 0.21% 0.02  5.04 2.11 0.41 
 
 3.98 2.41 -0.20 
 
 4.87 0.01 
1908 1919  0.26% 0.41% 0.03  2.14 1.02 0.35 
 
 4.77 3.49 0.85 
 
 4.80 0.12 
                   
Notes: Peaks and Troughs in Integration chosen as cyclical highs and lows in the adjusted R2 between returns on US securities on NYSE and UK securities 
on LSE. GDP Growth, interest rates and exchange rate data obtained on an annual basis from Williamson, 'U.S. GDP', Officer and Williamson, 'U.K. GDP', 
Officer, 'Interest Rate', and Officer, 'Exchange Rate'. 
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Table 5: Regressions Explaining NYSE Return using LSE UK Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
L1LSERf -0.016 0.005 -0.025 -0.024 -0.085 -0.030 -0.136 
 (0.080) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082) (0.091) (0.077) (0.102) 
LSERf 0.504*** 0.510*** 0.500*** 0.494*** 0.571*** 0.481*** 0.459*** 
 (0.086) (0.093) (0.088) (0.088) (0.094) (0.082) (0.108) 
F1LSERf 0.327*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.397*** 0.311*** 0.251** 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.083) (0.082) (0.089) (0.078) (0.104) 
L1Term  -0.107     -0.003 
  (0.144)     (0.139) 
Term  -0.105     0.060 
  (0.158)     (0.141) 
F1Term  0.035     0.216* 
  (0.134)     (0.128) 
L1Def  -0.049     0.042 
  (0.125)     (0.123) 
Def  -0.076     0.065 
  (0.139)     (0.123) 
F1Def  0.159     0.285*** 
  (0.112)     (0.106) 
L1SMB   0.004    -0.062 
   (0.102)    (0.102) 
SMB   -0.009    -0.144 
   (0.100)    (0.101) 
F1SMB   0.134    -0.037 
   (0.101)    (0.104) 
L1HML    0.049   0.122 
    (0.091)   (0.093) 
HML    0.143   0.126 
    (0.099)   (0.103) 
F1HML    0.066   0.011 
    (0.097)   (0.098) 
L1Rail     0.088**  0.150** 
     (0.042)  (0.059) 
Rail     -0.125***  -0.021 
     (0.041)  (0.058) 
F1Rail     -0.110***  0.033 
     (0.041)  (0.060) 
L1Export      -0.041 0.170 
      (0.079) (0.111) 
Export      0.272*** 0.288*** 
      (0.079) (0.106) 
F1Export      0.328*** 0.425*** 
      (0.075) (0.112) 
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Observations 1,169 1,169 1,160 1,160 1,169 1,169 1,160 
Adj-R2 0.072 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.085 0.097 0.097 
Notes: The returns of the portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities, including dividends and capital gains. Cross-
listed securities are excluded. The dependent variable is the returns on the portfolio of US securities listed on NYSE, minus the risk-free 
rate. Term is the difference between the returns from short-term first class bills, and long-term British government Consols. Def is the 
difference between the returns on British government Consols and a portfolio of all corporate debt listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
LSERf is a portfolio of UK equities listed on LSE, minus the risk-free rate. Other portfolios are formed from equities on LSE based on their 
characteristics. SMB is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small companies minus big companies. HML is the difference in 
returns between a portfolio of high dividend yield companies minus low dividend yield companies. Rail is the difference in returns between 
railway companies and non-railway companies. Export is the difference in returns between companies in industries which could potentially 
export products and those in non-export industries. L1 refers to the previous month’s value, and F1 refers to the next month’s value. 
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Table 6: Comparison between New York, Brussels and Paris using LSE UK Factors 
 1832 - 1925  1854 – 1925 
 NYSE NYSE Brussels Brussels  NYSE NYSE Paris Paris 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
L1LSERf -0.069 -0.250* 0.036 0.005  -0.286** -0.629*** -0.040 0.076 
 (0.093) (0.128) (0.057) (0.075)  (0.132) (0.205) (0.061) (0.097) 
LSERf 0.604*** 0.517*** 0.366*** 0.360***  0.818*** 0.588*** 0.281*** 0.166 
 (0.100) (0.131) (0.061) (0.080)  (0.143) (0.210) (0.070) (0.103) 
F1LSERf 0.389*** 0.336*** 0.083* 0.107*  0.515*** 0.340 0.253*** 0.244*** 
 (0.094) (0.127) (0.050) (0.064)  (0.132) (0.208) (0.063) (0.091) 
L1Term  0.052  0.057   0.470  0.060 
  (0.161)  (0.126)   (0.331)  (0.162) 
Term  -0.016  0.080   -0.191  0.191 
  (0.159)  (0.124)   (0.326)  (0.207) 
F1Term  0.157  -0.146   0.264  -0.034 
  (0.147)  (0.105)   (0.326)  (0.191) 
L1Def  0.075  0.102   0.493  0.096 
  (0.141)  (0.103)   (0.321)  (0.148) 
Def  0.009  0.067   -0.094  -0.040 
  (0.137)  (0.104)   (0.316)  (0.193) 
F1Def  0.313***  -0.111   0.527*  -0.095 
  (0.119)  (0.091)   (0.311)  (0.190) 
L1SMB  -0.042  0.021   -0.227  -0.064 
  (0.119)  (0.074)   (0.185)  (0.083) 
SMB  -0.202*  -0.214***   -0.204  -0.190** 
  (0.118)  (0.076)   (0.178)  (0.089) 
F1SMB  0.008  -0.052   0.183  -0.003 
  (0.121)  (0.065)   (0.189)  (0.092) 
L1HML  0.116  -0.072   0.198  -0.097 
  (0.111)  (0.059)   (0.158)  (0.077) 
HML  0.188  0.120*   0.358**  0.076 
  (0.120)  (0.068)   (0.168)  (0.085) 
F1HML  -0.008  0.047   -0.129  0.128 
  (0.117)  (0.065)   (0.167)  (0.087) 
L1Rail  0.244***  0.060   0.172  -0.200*** 
  (0.091)  (0.048)   (0.158)  (0.067) 
Rail  0.009  -0.067   0.050  0.062 
  (0.092)  (0.048)   (0.141)  (0.069) 
F1Rail  0.040  -0.015   0.104  -0.051 
  (0.089)  (0.050)   (0.140)  (0.072) 
L1Export  0.306*  0.087   0.554**  -0.157 
  (0.160)  (0.083)   (0.252)  (0.101) 
Export  0.360**  0.097   0.285  0.110 
  (0.153)  (0.079)   (0.233)  (0.102) 
F1Export  0.512***  0.133   0.592**  -0.103 
  (0.155)  (0.089)   (0.240)  (0.100) 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.002*** 0.002***  0.001 0.002 0.003*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
          
Observations 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089  835 835 834 834 
Adj-R2 0.071 0.103 0.070 0.094  0.088 0.111 0.070 0.088 
Notes: The dependent variable is the returns on the portfolio of a particular market index, minus the risk-free rate. Term is the difference 
between the returns from short-term first class bills, and long-term British government Consols. Def is the difference between the returns on 
British government Consols and a portfolio of all corporate debt listed on the London Stock Exchange. LSERf is a portfolio of UK equities 
listed on LSE, minus the risk-free rate. Other portfolios are formed from equities on LSE based on their characteristics. SMB is the difference in 
returns between a portfolio of small companies minus big companies. HML is the difference in returns between a portfolio of high dividend 
yield companies minus low dividend yield companies. Rail is the difference in returns between railway companies and non-railway companies. 
Export is the difference in returns between companies in industries which could potentially export products and those in non-export industries. 
L1 refers to the previous month’s value, and F1 refers to the next month’s value. 
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Table 7: Regressions Explaining  
NYSE Returns on Equities and Non-Equities, using LSE UK Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 NYSE 
Equity 
NYSE 
NonEquity 
NYSE 
Equity 
NYSE 
NonEquity 
     
L1LSERf -0.065  -0.186 -0.061 
 (0.089)  (0.114) (0.089) 
LSERf 0.585***  0.527*** 0.231** 
 (0.096)  (0.118) (0.094) 
F1LSERf 0.375***  0.311*** 0.097 
 (0.090)  (0.116) (0.082) 
L1Term  0.058 0.009 -0.012 
  (0.088) (0.156) (0.100) 
Term  0.275*** 0.005 0.142 
  (0.104) (0.155) (0.123) 
F1Term  0.181** 0.195 0.155* 
  (0.083) (0.145) (0.092) 
L1Def  0.022 0.063 -0.014 
  (0.077) (0.138) (0.082) 
Def  0.251*** 0.021 0.177* 
  (0.094) (0.136) (0.100) 
F1Def  0.219*** 0.305** 0.171** 
  (0.072) (0.120) (0.072) 
L1SMB   -0.061 -0.050 
   (0.114) (0.081) 
SMB   -0.188* -0.072 
   (0.112) (0.083) 
F1SMB   -0.021 -0.113 
   (0.116) (0.082) 
L1HML   0.119 0.139* 
   (0.104) (0.072) 
HML   0.174 0.056 
   (0.114) (0.080) 
F1HML   0.023 0.001 
   (0.110) (0.075) 
L1Rail   0.152** 0.159** 
   (0.064) (0.079) 
Rail   -0.009 -0.102 
   (0.064) (0.074) 
F1Rail   0.031 -0.050 
   (0.065) (0.068) 
L1Export   0.179 0.161 
   (0.123) (0.117) 
Export   0.346*** 0.031 
   (0.119) (0.105) 
F1Export   0.473*** 0.171 
   (0.124) (0.105) 
Constant 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 1,169 1,004 1,160 1,004 
Adj-R2 0.071 0.015 0.098 0.057 
Notes: The returns of the portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities, including dividends and capital gains. Cross-listed securities are 
excluded. The dependent variable is the returns on the portfolio of US equities or non-equities listed on NYSE, minus the risk-free rate. Term is the difference 
between the returns from short-term first class bills, and long-term British government Consols. Def is the difference between the returns on British government 
Consols and a portfolio of all corporate debt listed on the London Stock Exchange. LSERf is a portfolio of UK equities listed on LSE, minus the risk-free rate. 
Other portfolios are formed from equities on LSE based on their characteristics. SMB is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small companies minus big 
companies. HML is the difference in returns between a portfolio of high dividend yield companies minus low dividend yield companies. Rail is the difference in 
returns between railway companies and non-railway companies. Export is the difference in returns between companies in industries which could potentially export 
products and those in non-export industries. L1 refers to the previous month’s value, and F1 refers to the next month’s value. 
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Table 8: Regressions Explaining NYSE Return  
using LSE International Factors 
 
 1825 – 1925  1870 – 1925 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
NonUK.L1  0.059    0.054    
  (0.046)    (0.244)    
NonUK  0.037    0.714***    
  (0.048)    (0.211)    
NonUK.F1  0.040    0.408**    
  (0.043)    (0.198)    
Americas.L1   0.018    -0.109   
   (0.038)    (0.127)   
Americas   0.135***    0.861***   
   (0.042)    (0.150)   
Americas.F1   0.106***    0.480***   
   (0.040)    (0.129)   
USA.L1        0.083 -0.015 
        (0.088) (0.088) 
USA        1.061*** 0.833*** 
        (0.094) (0.092) 
USA.F1        0.271*** 0.254*** 
        (0.085) (0.093) 
USA-Def.L1         0.125 
         (0.161) 
USA-Def         0.408** 
         (0.169) 
USA-Def.F1         0.004 
         (0.175) 
USA-SMB.L1         -0.059 
         (0.052) 
USA-SMB         -0.350*** 
         (0.053) 
USA-SMB.F1         -0.053 
         (0.052) 
USA-HML.L1         0.016 
         (0.041) 
USA-HML         -0.071 
         (0.046) 
USA-HML.F1         0.010 
         (0.041) 
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
          
UK Factors YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160  658 658 658 658 658 
Adj-R2 0.097 0.097 0.107  0.132 0.154 0.214 0.343 0.420 
Notes: The returns of the portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities, including dividends and capital gains. Cross-
listed securities are excluded. The dependent variable is the returns on the portfolio of US securities listed on NYSE, minus the risk-free 
rate. Other portfolios are formed from securities on LSE based on their characteristics. Regional indices are orthogonalised by regressing 
their portfolio returns against a portfolio of UK securities. NonUK includes companies operating in any region outside the UK. Americas 
includes companies operating in North or South America. USA includes companies operating in the United States. USA-SMB is the 
difference in returns between a portfolio of small companies minus big US companies listed on LSE. HML is the difference in returns 
between a portfolio of high dividend yield companies minus low dividend yield US companies listed on LSE. L1 refers to the previous 
month’s value, and F1 refers to the next month’s value. All UK factors from Table 5 are included in each regression, but not reported 
individually.
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Table 9: Regressions Explaining NYSE Capital Gains  
using LSE International Factors 
 
 1825 – 1925  1870 – 1925 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
CGNonUK.L1  0.056    0.013    
  (0.048)    (0.244)    
CGNonUK  0.057    0.783***    
  (0.049)    (0.209)    
CGNonUK.F1  0.042    0.400**    
  (0.044)    (0.198)    
CGAmericas.L1   0.027    -0.117   
   (0.041)    (0.130)   
CGAmericas   0.170***    0.921***   
   (0.043)    (0.137)   
CGAmericas.F1   0.117***    0.486***   
   (0.042)    (0.128)   
CGUSA.L1        0.089 -0.004 
        (0.086) (0.087) 
CGUSA        1.051*** 0.824*** 
        (0.093) (0.091) 
CGUSA.F1        0.282*** 0.260*** 
        (0.083) (0.092) 
CGUSA-Def.L1         0.111 
         (0.160) 
CGUSA-Def         0.361** 
         (0.168) 
CGUSA-Def.F1         0.013 
         (0.175) 
CGUSA-SMB.L1         -0.054 
         (0.052) 
CGUSA-SMB         -0.361*** 
         (0.054) 
CGUSA-SMB.F1         -0.058 
         (0.051) 
CGUSA-HML.L1         0.018 
         (0.041) 
CGUSA-HML         -0.073 
         (0.046) 
CGUSA-HML.F1         -0.001 
         (0.041) 
Constant 0.002* 0.002 0.001  0.003** 0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          
UK Factors YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160  658 658 658 658 658 
Adj-R2 0.0870 0.0867 0.101  0.138 0.161 0.225 0.349 0.428 
Notes: The capital gains of the portfolios are equally weighted averages of the individual securities. Cross-listed securities are excluded. The 
dependent variable is the capital gains on the portfolio of US securities listed on NYSE. Other portfolios are formed from securities on LSE 
based on their characteristics. Regional indices are orthogonalised by regressing their portfolio capital gains against a portfolio of UK 
securities. NonUK includes companies operating in any region outside the UK. Americas includes companies operating in North or South 
America. USA includes companies operating in the United States. USA-SMB is the difference in capital gains between a portfolio of small 
companies minus big US companies listed on LSE. HML is the difference in capital gains between a portfolio of high dividend yield 
companies minus low dividend yield US companies listed on LSE. L1 refers to the previous month’s value, and F1 refers to the next 
month’s value. All UK factors are included in each regression, but not reported individually.
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Table 10: Price Ratios and Cointegration Tests of Cross-Listed Stocks 
 Years   Price Ratio  
ADF of Residual 
from Cointegrating 
Regression 
 
Adj. R2 of Error 
Correction Model 
 
 
Start End Obs 
 
Mean St. Dev 
  
Returns Cap Gains 
Second Bank of the United States (Shares) 1825 1841 155 
 
0.995 0.047 
 
-9.813 
 
73.2% 72.0% 
New York Lake Erie & Western Railroad (Common stock) 1857 1871 106 
 
0.986 0.077 
 
-6.724 
 
62.3% 61.1% 
Illinois Central Railroad ($100 shares) 1860 1925 569 
 
1.001 0.014 
 
-21.385 
 
61.0% 60.9% 
New York Central and Hudson River (7 % Bonds) 1875 1892 125 
 
1.000 0.005 
 
-8.445 
 
36.7% 41.2% 
Union Pacific ($100 shares) 1878 1898 169 
 
1.001 0.043 
 
-8.672 
 
84.6% 84.6% 
Central Pacific and California ($100 Shares) 1881 1899 170 
 
1.002 0.046 
 
-12.080 
 
81.5% 81.4% 
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern (Shares) 1881 1898 177 
 
1.001 0.011 
 
-7.699 
 
70.6% 70.7% 
Louisville & Nashville ($100 shares) 1881 1925 456 
 
1.002 0.014 
 
-19.889 
 
78.4% 78.4% 
Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul (Common stock) 1883 1925 454 
 
1.001 0.036 
 
-13.750 
 
69.9% 70.1% 
Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul (5 % Chic. & Pacific Western 1921) 1883 1908 160 
 
0.998 0.004 
 
-13.408 
 
60.3% 58.7% 
Denver and Rio Grande (Common Stock) 1883 1920 314 
 
0.998 0.049 
 
-16.467 
 
79.3% 79.3% 
Baltimore & Ohio (5 % gold bonds 1925) 1886 1894 61 
 
0.997 0.003 
 
-6.340 
 
55.4% 54.7% 
Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul (7 % preferred stock) 1886 1925 324 
 
1.003 0.026 
 
-17.510 
 
73.5% 73.4% 
Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul (5 % gold bonds) 1886 1898 67 
 
1.000 0.005 
 
-6.175 
 
51.9% 50.7% 
Northern Pacific (Preferred stock) 1887 1901 154 
 
1.012 0.054 
 
-7.064 
 
74.0% 73.7% 
Northern Pacific (Common stock) 1887 1925 237 
 
1.006 0.032 
 
-13.933 
 
84.3% 84.4% 
Wabash (Preferred stock) 1890 1914 242 
 
1.001 0.066 
 
-7.628 
 
65.3% 65.3% 
Wabash (Capital stock) 1890 1911 124 
 
0.994 0.067 
 
-6.466 
 
74.0% 74.0% 
Chesapeake & Ohio (Capital stock) 1891 1925 345 
 
1.000 0.032 
 
-15.761 
 
77.9% 77.5% 
Miss. Kan. & Tex. (Common stock) 1891 1923 255 
 
1.010 0.111 
 
-12.808 
 
69.3% 69.3% 
St Paul Minn. & Mani. (Capital stock) 1891 1898 67 
 
1.003 0.009 
 
-5.485 
 
58.6% 58.9% 
Chesapeake & Ohio (5% Gold Bonds) 1892 1924 254 
 
1.001 0.006 
 
-9.615 
 
70.4% 70.1% 
Chicago R. I. and Pacific (4 % Gold coup bonds) 1899 1923 128 
 
1.002 0.009 
 
-6.381 
 
69.2% 69.1% 
Union Pacific Rlrd. and Lnd. Gt. (4 % Bonds) 1899 1925 219 
 
0.999 0.006 
 
-9.925 
 
64.2% 64.4% 
Central Pacific (4 % 1st refund bonds 1945) 1900 1925 205 
 
1.000 0.007 
 
-8.553 
 
69.7% 70.5% 
Erie Railroad (4 % non-cum. 1st pref) 1900 1925 256 
 
0.999 0.029 
 
-9.167 
 
82.2% 82.3% 
Erie Railroad (4 % non-cum. 2nd pref) 1900 1925 229 
 
1.001 0.047 
 
-11.867 
 
74.4% 74.6% 
Northern Pacific (Prior Lien 4 % 1997) 1900 1925 214 
 
0.999 0.007 
 
-8.200 
 
63.7% 64.0% 
Baltimore & Ohio (Stock certs) 1902 1925 241 
 
1.001 0.016 
 
-12.977 
 
77.9% 78.3% 
Baltimore & Ohio (4 % non-cum. pref) 1902 1925 180 
 
1.004 0.008 
 
-11.844 
 
83.4% 83.6% 
Northern Pacific Gt. Northern (General lien 3 %) 1905 1925 180 
 
1.000 0.009 
 
-6.108 
 
65.8% 66.1% 
Rock Island Co. (Com. stock) 1905 1913 94 
 
0.998 0.018 
 
-9.395 
 
93.7% 93.7% 
Union Pacific Rlrd. & Land Grant (4 % non-cum. pref) 1907 1925 157 
 
1.002 0.007 
 
-9.091 
 
76.4% 76.2% 
Union Pacific Rlrd. & Land Grant (4 % 1st lien) 1909 1925 166 
 
1.008 0.010 
 
-6.355 
 
61.5% 61.2% 
Denver & Rio Grande (5 % non-cum. pref) 1911 1920 78 
 
0.961 0.093 
 
-4.892 
 
80.4% 80.4% 
Amer. Telep. & Telegraph (Cap stock) 1913 1925 105 
 
1.002 0.007 
 
-7.083 
 
75.0% 75.2% 
Notes: Each asset which was cross-listed on both NYSE and LSE simultaneously, and traded for at least 60 months, is shown. The ratio of the log of the price on NYSE to the log of the price on LSE is 
calculated each month, and the mean and standard deviation is reported. The log of the price in New York was also regressed against the log of the price in London, and the residuals tested using an 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The Adjusted R2 from an Error Correction Model is also shown which regresses the returns on NYSE against the returns on LSE, one lag and lead, and the lagged 
residual from the cointegrating relationship. 
